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Abstract
We argue that active management’s popularity is not puzzling despite the industry’s poor track record. Our
explanation features decreasing returns to scale: As the industry’s size increases, every manager’s ability to
outperform passive benchmarks declines. The poor track record occurred before the growth of indexing
modestly reduced the share of active management to its current size. At this size, better performance is
expected by investors who believe in decreasing returns to scale. Such beliefs persist because persistence in
industry size causes learning about returns to scale to be slow. The industry should shrink only moderately if
its underperformance continues.
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On the Size of the Active Management
Industry
Lˇubosˇ Pa´stor
University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research
Robert F. Stambaugh
University of Pennsylvania and National Bureau of Economic Research
We argue that active management’s popularity is not puzzling despite
the industry’s poor track record. Our explanation features decreasing
returns to scale: As the industry’s size increases, every manager’s ability
to outperform passive benchmarks declines. The poor track record oc-
curred before the growth of indexingmodestly reduced the share of ac-
tive management to its current size. At this size, better performance is
expected by investors who believe in decreasing returns to scale. Such
beliefs persist becausepersistence in industry size causes learningabout
returns to scale to be slow. The industry should shrink only moderately
if its underperformance continues.
I. Introduction
Active asset management remains popular, even though its track record
has long been unimpressive. For example, consider actively managed eq-
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uity mutual funds, which constitute a large and well-researched segment
of the active management industry. Numerous studies report that these
funds have provided investors with average returns significantly below
those on passive benchmarks.1 While this track record could help explain
the growth of index funds, the total size of index funds is stillmodest com-
pared to that of activelymanaged funds.2 Given the negative track record,
onemight be puzzled by the enormous size of the active management in-
dustry.
We argue that the popularity of active management is not puzzling de-
spite its poor track record. Key to this conclusion is to realize that the ac-
tive management industry faces decreasing returns to scale: any fund
manager’s ability to outperform a passive benchmark declines as the in-
dustry’s size increases. As more money chases opportunities to outper-
form, prices are affected and such opportunities become more elusive.
A simple way of modeling returns to scale is as follows:
at5 a2 b
S
W
 
t
; ð1Þ
where at is the industry’s expected return at time t in excess of passive
benchmarks and S=Wð Þt is the industry’s size as a fraction of the total
amount managed actively and passively. Decreasing returns to scale are
captured by b > 0. If the benchmarks are sufficient for pricing assets in an
efficientmarket,at reflects assetmispricing. In that case, ourmodeling of
decreasing returns to scale is equivalent to assuming that mispricing is re-
duced as more money seeks to exploit it.
Decreasing returns to scale help us understand the continued popular-
ity of active management. Investors are uncertain about the industry’s al-
pha, and they learn about it from realized returns. After observing nega-
tive performance, investors infer that a is lower than expected, and they
reduce their allocation to active management. Indeed, the growth of
indexing over the past few decades has modestly reduced the share of ac-
tivemanagement to its current size.The fact that the reduction inS=W has
beenmodest is consistent with the cushioning provided by decreasing re-
turns to scale: a lower S=W implies a higher a going forward. Investors in-
fer that a is too low at the current level of S=W , but they know that a will
go up after they reduce S=W , so they disinvest less than they would if re-
turns to scale were constant. Under decreasing returns to scale, past un-
1 See Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Wermers (2000), Pa´stor and Stam-
baugh (2002b), Fama and French (2010), Del Guercio and Reuter (2011), and others. Fama
and French report that, over the past 23 years, an aggregate portfolio of US equity mutual
funds underperformed various benchmarks by about 1 percent per year.
2 The Investment Company Institute (2009) reports that assets of equity mutual funds to-
tal $3.8 trillion at the end of 2008. They also report that 87 percent of those assets are under
active management, as opposed to being index funds.
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derperformance does not imply future underperformance; it implies only
that investors should allocate less to active management. After a period of
underperformance, the optimal allocation to active management should
be smaller than it was at the beginning of the period, but it may remain
substantial.
To explore the quantitative implications of the above story, we develop
a model of active management featuring Sharpe ratio–maximizing inves-
tors and fee-maximizing fundmanagers. Wemodel decreasing returns to
scale in a way similar to equation (1), with unknown parameters a and b.
We derive the model’s implications for the equilibrium size of the active
management industry, measured in relative terms as S=W . We also solve
for the equilibrium a and the manager fee.
Wefind that the industry’s equilibrium sizedepends critically on thede-
gree of competition among investors and fund managers. The role of
competition is especially clear in the special case in which investors are
risk neutral. In the absence of competition among either investors or
managers, the equilibrium industry size maximizes the expected total
profit. If investors compete but managers do not, all the profit goes to
managers in the form of fees; if managers compete but investors do not,
all the profit goes to investors in the form of alpha. A different picture
emerges under perfect competition among both investors andmanagers.
Interestingly, the industry’s fully competitive equilibrium size is twice
as large as the size obtained if either type of competition is shut down.
The fully competitive industry produces zero expected total profit, so that
investors earn zero alpha and managers earn no abnormal fee.
Our results highlight an externality that is inherent in active investing
under decreasing returns to scale: when investors compete, they dilute
each other’s returns by investing to the point at which the expected active
alpha is zero.Owing to this externality, competition results in overproduc-
tion of active management relative to the profit-maximizing size, making
it easier to understand why active management is so popular. If more ac-
tivemanagement implies lessmispricing, thenmore competition also im-
pliesmore efficient assetmarkets. This result has clearpolicy implications.
Focusing on the fully competitive setting, we compare the model-
implied equilibrium size of the activemanagement industry with the actual
size. To measure the industry’s actual size, we rely on data for US equity
mutual funds, which we assume to be representative of the industry as
a whole. The advantage of using mutual fund data is that the histories
of fund returns and assets under management are longer and more re-
liable than those of any other segment of the asset management indus-
try. We measure the industry’s actual S=W as assets under management
for all active funds dividedby assets undermanagement for active andpas-
sive funds combined. The latest value of this ratio, computed as of the be-
ginning of 2006, is 0.87.
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We examine the conditions under which the rational investors in our
model currently choose an 87 percent allocation to active management.
The investors choose their allocations after updating their prior beliefs
about a and b with the available historical data. The data consist of a 44-
year history of the actual S=W values and returns on the aggregate port-
folio of actively managed US equity mutual funds. This history paints an
unfavorable view of active funds, whose aggregate portfolio has signifi-
cantly underperformed the market.3 Despite the negative return history,
we find that the 87 percent allocation to active management is consistent
with a variety of prior beliefs, as long as those beliefs feature decreasing
returns to scale. For example, for our baseline prior specification for a,
the 87 percent allocation is chosen by investors who expect b to be about
0.1 a priori.Our results seem robust to alternative prior specifications.We
conclude that the observed large size of the active management industry
can be rationalized by decreasing returns to scale in the industry.
In contrast, activemanagement’s popularity would seemquite puzzling
under themore traditional assumption of constant returns to scale (b50
in eq. [1]). This assumption is routinely adopted by performance evalua-
tion studies, in which alphas are generally treated as constants, unrelated
to the industry’s size.Wefind that under constant returns to scale, the cur-
rent size of the active management industry should be zero. With b50,
the industry’s track record quickly leads investors to perceive a<0 at any
S=W , even if their prior beliefs about a are more optimistic than those
leading to the resultsmentioned above under decreasing returns to scale.
With a<0, any positive investment in activemanagement would be unde-
sirable for mean-variance investors; they would instead go short if they
could. If our rational investors thought returns to scale were constant, the
active management industry would have disappeared many years ago.
Is the industry likely to remain large in the future? To answer this ques-
tion, we simulate future paths of returns from our model under prior be-
liefs that are consistent with the industry’s current size. We then calcu-
late the expected future industry size after observing various potential
track records. We find that S=W is likely to remain large for a long time,
even if the industry continues to significantly underperform its bench-
mark. For example, conditional on the future t-statistic of alpha equal to
22, S=W is expected to decline only to 63.4 percent after 20 years. The
industry’s decline in response to underperformance is restrained by
decreasing returns to scale: investors know that when they allocate less
to active management, their future active returns will be higher. In con-
trast, the industry would shrink much faster in response to underperfor-
3 When we regress aggregate active fund excess returns on market excess returns in our
full sample of January 1962 through September 2006, the annualized estimated alpha is
288 basis points, with a t-statistic of 22.7. Our data, which come from Ken French, are de-
scribed in more detail in Sec. III.B.
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mance if returns to scalewere constant: for example, for the same t-statistic
of22, the industrywoulddisappear after just 1 yearofunderperformance,
which seems implausible.Weconclude that owing todecreasing returns to
scale, the active management industry is likely to remain large for many
years.
Our proposed reconciliation of the activemanagement industry’s large
size with its poor track record is the main contribution of this paper. Our
second contribution is to show that learning about returns to scale in ac-
tive management is slow. Investors in our model face endogeneity that
limits their learning about a and b in equation (1). As investors update
their beliefs about a and b, they adjust S=W . They learn about a and b by
observing the industry’s returns that follow different allocations. The ex-
tent to which they learn is thus endogenous: what they learn affects how
much they allocate, but what they allocate affects howmuch they learn. At
the extreme, if investors were to keep S=W constant over time, they would
eventually learn the value of a at that level of S=W , but they would learn
nothing about a and b individually. While the equilibrium S=W generally
does vary over time, its fluctuations are significantly muted by decreasing
returns to scale. This lack of variation in S=W impedes learning about a
and b. As a result, investors remain highly uncertain about a and b even
after observing long histories of data. For the same reason, the investors’
initial beliefs about returns to scale persist for a long time.
Our reliance on decreasing returns to scale in activemanagement owes
a debt to the innovative use of this concept by Berk and Green (2004),
although our focus and implementation are quite different. Berk and
Green assume that an individual fund’s returns are decreasing in its own
size rather than in the total amount of activemanagement. In theirmodel,
as investors update their beliefs about each manager’s skill, funds with
positive track records attract new money and grow in size, whereas funds
with negative track records experience withdrawals and shrink in size. In
reality, activelymanaged funds have a significantly negative aggregate track
record, yet the active management industry remains large. We address this
apparent “active-management puzzle.” Departing from Berk and Green’s
cross-sectional focus, we analyze the aggregate size of the active manage-
ment industry.
We are not alone in trying to explain the puzzling popularity of active
management in light of its poor track record. In our explanation, inves-
tors do not expect negative past performance to continue, but in other
explanations they do. Gruber (1996) suggests that some “disadvantaged”
investors are influenced by advertising and brokers, institutional arrange-
ments, or tax considerations. Glode (2011) presents an explanation in
which investors expect negative future performance as a fair trade-off for
countercyclical performance by fundmanagers. Savov (2009) argues that
active funds underperformpassive indices but they do not underperform
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actual index fund investments because investors buy in and out of index
funds at the wrong time. We do not imply that such alternative explana-
tions play no role in resolving the puzzle. We simply suggest that the same
job can be accomplished with rational investors who do not expect under-
performance going forward.
A number of studies address learning about managerial skill, but none
of them consider learning about returns to scale, nor do they analyze the
size of the activemanagement industry. Baks,Metrick, andWachter (2001)
examine track records of active mutual funds and find that extremely
skeptical prior beliefs about skill would be required to produce zero in-
vestment in all funds. They solve the Bayesian portfolio problem fund by
fund, whereas Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2002a) and Avramov andWermers
(2006) construct optimal portfolios of funds. Other studies that model
learning about managerial skill with a focus different from ours include
Lynch and Musto (2003), Berk and Green (2004), Huang, Wei, and Yan
(2007), and Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2008).
Our study relates to a number of other directions in recent research.
Viewed broadly, the study adds to a growing literature addressing the
size of various aspects of the financial industry (e.g., Philippon 2008; Bol-
ton, Santos, and Scheinkman 2011). Garcia and Vanden (2009) analyze
mutual fund formation in a general equilibrium setting with private infor-
mation. In their model, the size of the mutual fund industry follows from
theagents’ informationacquisitiondecisions. Asset prices aredetermined
endogenously in their model but not in ours; in that sense, our approach
can be described as partial equilibrium, similar to that in Berk and Green
(2004).4 Recentmodels of mutual fund formation also includeMamaysky
and Spiegel (2002) and Stein (2005). Neither these models nor that of
Garcia and Vanden examines the roles of learning and past data. A num-
ber of studies examine equilibrium fee setting by money managers, which
occurs in our model as well. Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000) do so
in a model in which a fund’s return before fees is affected by liquidity costs
that increase in fund size. Fee setting is also examined by Chordia (1996)
and Das and Sundaram (2002), among others. Finally, Khorana, Servaes,
and Tufano (2005) empirically analyze the determinants of the size of the
mutual fund industry across countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our model. After
describing the general setting, wefirst examine the case inwhich investors
are risk neutral. The simple results obtained there for alphas, fees, and in-
dustry size clearly reveal the role of competition amongmanagers and in-
vestors. We then move to a mean-variance setting, which forms the basis
4 In addition to Garcia and Vanden (2009), recent examples of studies that analyze the
effect of delegated portfolio management on equilibrium asset prices also include Vayanos
andWoolley (2008), Petajisto (2009),CuocoandKaniel (2011),Dasgupta, Prat, andVerardo
(2011), Guerrieri and Kondor (2012), and He and Krishnamurthy (forthcoming).
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for our empirical work. Section III discusses the priors and their updating
with data. Section IV presents the model’s quantitative implications for
the industry’s current size given its historical track record. Section V cal-
culates the expected future industry size after observing various potential
future track records. It also discusses the properties of learning about
returns to scale. Section VI relates our model to that of Berk and Green
(2004). Section VII presents conclusions.
II. Model
A. Setting
Wemodel two types of agents: fundmanagers and investors. There areM
active fundmanagerswhohave thepotential ability to identify andexploit
opportunities to outperform passive benchmarks. There are N investors
who allocate their wealth across the M active funds as well as the passive
benchmarks. We focus primarily on a perfectly competitive setting with
infinite numbers of both managers and investors who play infinitesimal
individual roles in equilibrium (M → `, N → `). To emphasize the im-
portant role of competition when there are decreasing returns to scale,
we also consider two alternative settings. In one there is perfect competi-
tion amongmanagers but only a single investor (M → `,N 51), whereas
in theother there is perfect competition among investors but only a single
manager (M 51, N → `).
The rates of return earned by investors in themanagers’ funds obey the
regression model
rF 5a 1 brP 1 u; ð2Þ
where rF is theM1 vector of fund returns in excess of the riskless rate, a
is the M 1 vector of fund alphas, rP is the excess return on the passive
benchmark portfolio, b is the M1 vector of fund betas, and u is the
M1 vector of the residuals. Thepassive benchmarkportfolio’s excess re-
turn has mean mP and variance j
2
P . We suppress time subscripts through-
out to simplify notation. The elements of the residual vector u have the
following factor structure:
ui5 x 1 ei ð3Þ
for i51; : : : ; M, where all ei’s have a mean of zero, a variance of j2e , and
zero correlation with each other. The common factor x has mean zero
and variance j2x . The values of b, mP , jP , jx , and je are constants known to
both investors and managers.
The factor structure inequation (3)means that thebenchmark-adjusted
returns of skilled managers are correlated as long as jx > 0. Skill is the
ability to identify opportunities to outperform passive benchmarks, so
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the same opportunities are likely to be identified bymultiple skilledman-
agers. Therefore, multiple managers are likely to hold some of the same
positions, resulting in correlated benchmark-adjusted returns.5 As a re-
sult, the risk associated with active investing cannot be fully diversified
away by investing in a large number of funds.
The expected benchmark-adjusted dollar profit received in total by
fund i’s investors and manager is denoted by pi. Our key assumption is
that pi is decreasing in S=W , where S is the aggregate size of the active
management industry and W is equal to S plus the amount invested
in the passive benchmark. Dividing S by W reflects the notion that the
industry’s relative (rather than absolute) size is relevant for capturing
decreasing returns to scale in active management. In order to obtain
closed-form equilibrium results, we assume the functional relation
pi5 si a2 b
S
W
 
; ð4Þ
where si is the size of manager i ’s fund, with S5 oMi 5 1si . The parameters a
and b in equation (4) are unknown. We denote their first and second
conditional moments by
E
a
b
jD 5 a˜
b˜

;

ð5Þ
Var
a
b
jD 5 j2a jab
jab j
2
b

;

ð6Þ
where D denotes the set of information available to investors.
The parameter a represents the expected return on the initial small
fraction of wealth invested in active management, net of proportional
costs andmanagerial compensation ina competitive setting. It seems likely
that a > 0, although we do not preclude a <0. If no money were invested
in activemanagement, nomanagers would be searching for opportunities
tooutperform thepassive benchmarks, so someopportunitieswould likely
be present. The initial active investment picks low-hanging fruit, so it is
likely to have a positive expected benchmark-adjusted return.
The parameter b determines the degree to which the expected bench-
mark-adjusted return for any manager declines as the relative size of active
management increases. We allow b ≥ 0, although it is likely that b > 0 be-
cause of decreasing returns to scale in the active management industry.
5 This correlation can be amplified if the managers employ leverage because then nega-
tive shocks to the commonly employed strategy lead cash-constrained managers to unwind
their positions, magnifying the initial shock.
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As more money chases opportunities to outperform, prices are affected,
and such opportunities becomemore difficult for any manager to identify.
Prices are affected by these profit-chasing actions of active managers
unless markets are perfectly liquid. In that sense, b is related to market
liquidity: b50 in infinitely liquid markets but b > 0 otherwise.
We specify the relation (4) exogenously, but decreasing returns to ag-
gregate scale can also arise endogenously in a richermodel. In themodel
of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), for example, traders can choose to be-
come informed by paying a cost, and the proportion of informed traders
is determined in equilibrium. As this proportion rises, expected utility of
the informed traders falls relative to that of the uninformed traders, sim-
ilar in spirit to equation (4).
Manager i charges a proportional fee at rate fi . This is a fee that the fund
manager sets while taking into account its effect on the fund’s size. The
value of fi , known to investors whenmaking their investment decisions, is
chosen by manager i to maximize equilibrium fee revenue,
max
fi
fi si : ð7Þ
Combining this fee structure with (4), weobtain the following relation for
the ith element of a:
ai5a2 b
S
W
2 fi : ð8Þ
The relation between ai and the amount of active investment is plotted
in figure 1.
The N investors are assumed to allocate between the active funds and
the benchmark portfolio so as to maximize the Sharpe ratio of the result-
ing combination. Let dj denote theM 1 vector of the weights that inves-
tor j places on the M funds. For each investor j the allocations to the
funds solve the problem
max
dj
E rj jD
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Var rj jD
 q
8><
>:
9>=
>;; ð9Þ
where the excess return on the investor’s portfolio is given by
rj 5 d′j rF1 12 d′j iM
	 

rP ; ð10Þ
and iM denotes anM-vector of ones. We impose the restriction that all ele-
ments of the M 1 vector dj are nonnegative (no shorting of funds).
In equilibrium, the proportional allocation to activemanagement cho-
sen by each investor is equal to the aggregate ratio S=W . The equilibrium
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is partial in several respects.Thebenchmarkportfolio’s returns areassumed
tobeexogenously givenand, thus, unaffectedby theactionsof investors and
fund managers. In addition, the managers’ potential outperformance
comes at the expense of other investors whose decisions are not modeled
here.6 We also isolate an investor’s active-versus-passive allocation decision
from his labor income, real estate, nationality, and any state variables that
are typically associated with hedging demands. While such variables may
well be relevant for the investor’s consumption/investment decision and
6 The latter investors are required by the fact that alphas (before costs) must aggregate to
zero across all investors (see, e.g., Sharpe 1991; Fama and French 2010). In the absence of
such other investors, one could not expect active managers to earn positive alphas. These
other investors might trade for exogenous “liquidity” reasons, e.g., or they could engage in
their own active (nonbenchmark) investing without employing the M managers. They
could alsobe “misinformed” (FamaandFrench2007)or “irrational” in that theymightmake
systematicmistakes in evaluating the distributions of future payoffs. Such investorsmight re-
tain a significant fraction of wealth even in the long run, and they can affect asset prices even
if their wealth is very small (Kogan et al. 2006). Good candidates for such investors are indi-
viduals who invest in financial markets directly. For example, the proportion of US equity
held directly by individuals is substantial: in 1980–2007, this proportion ranged from 22 per-
cent in 2007 to 48 percent in 1980 (French 2008).
FIG. 1.—Decreasing returns to scale for the activemanagement industry. This figure plots
the theoretical relation between the expected benchmark-adjusted excess fund return be-
fore fees against the relative sizeof the activemanagement industry. Specifically, it plots equa-
tion (8): a1 f 5a2 b S=Wð Þ, where a is the expected benchmark-adjusted excess fund re-
turn earned by investors, f is the proportional fee charged by the fund manager, and S=W
is the aggregate allocation to active management. For b > 0, the industry exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. The values ofa, f, and S=W are determined in equilibrium. At S=W 5 S¯ =W ,
we have a5 f 50.
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even his overall asset allocation decision, they seem unlikely to have first-
order effects on deciding how to split financial wealth between active and
passive funds. In particular, it is not clear why any state variables should be
related to the nonbenchmark risk in active management, represented by u
in (2).
We assume that all funds have a beta of one: b5 iM , where b is defined
in equation (2).7 Combined with equations (2) and (10), this assumption
gives
rj 5 rP 1 d′j a1 uð Þ: ð11Þ
Thebenchmark return rP is then present in the investor’s portfolio return
for any choice of dj . In other words, with this unit-beta assumption, the al-
location decision hinges on the funds’ active contributions, a 1 u, but not
on their benchmark exposures.
B. Equilibrium under Risk Neutrality
Before turning to the mean-variance objective in (9), we first analyze the
risk-neutral setting in which investors simply maximize expected return,
solving the problem
max
dj
E rj jD
  
: ð12Þ
This simpler setting allows a more transparent analysis of the effects of
competition that also arise in themean-variance setting, as shown later in
Section IV. The following proposition gives the equilibrium values of the
key quantities under three alternative specifications of the nature of com-
petition between managers and investors.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium for investors and managers when
a˜ > 0, we have E ai jDð Þ5 a˜ and fi 5 f for all funds i receiving positive in-
vestment. With perfect competition among both managers and investors
(M → `, N → `),
f 50; ð13Þ
a˜ 50; ð14Þ
S
W
5
a˜
b˜
: ð15Þ
7 This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence for active equity mutual funds.
On the basis of monthly data for the January 1962–September 2006 period, the aggregate
portfolio of US actively managed mutual funds has a beta of 0.99 with respect to the value-
weighted market index.
750 journal of political economy
With perfect competition among managers but only a single investor
(M → `, N 51),
f 50; ð16Þ
a˜ 5
a˜
2
; ð17Þ
S
W
5
a˜
2b˜
: ð18Þ
With perfect competition among investors but only a single manager
(M 51, N → `),
f 5
a˜
2
; ð19Þ
a˜ 50; ð20Þ
S
W
5
a˜
2b˜
: ð21Þ
When a˜ ≤ 0, then S=W 50.
Proof. See the Appendix.
With competing managers, the equilibrium fee is f 50. If the fee were
instead equal to some positive value, any fund manager setting an infini-
tesimally lower fee would attract all investment from other funds to that
lower-fee fund. Note that f is the portion of a manager’s fee that he sets
while taking into account its effect on his fund’s size. In that sense it is
analogous to the part of the price that a supplier sets while taking into ac-
count its effect on his sales. Under perfect competition, suppliers and
managers are price takers, and such discretionary quantities vanish. That
does not mean that suppliers set a zero price or that managers work
for nothing. Any competitive proportional fee, which is not under a man-
ager’s discretion, is simply part of a. In other words, a is a rate of return net
of proportional costs of producing that return, where the latter costs (not
under themanager’s discretion) include competitive compensation to the
manager and other inputs to producing alpha.
With competing investors, the equilibrium expected alpha is a˜ 5 0.
Each investor in that setting sees his own investment as having no ef-
fect on S=W and thus no effect on alphas. Investors impose a negative
externality on each other: they dilute each other’s returns by investing to
the point at which the expected alpha on all active funds is zero. If the ex-
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pected alpha were instead positive, all investors would be dissatisfied with
their current holding of active funds and would wish to increase it, there-
by raising S=W and lowering alpha.
Withno competition amongmanagers or no competition among inves-
tors, the industry size is only half as large as in the fully competitive setting
(compare eq. [15] with [18] and [21]). The value in (18) and (21) is also
the value thatmaximizes expected total profit. That is, fromequation (4),
expected total profit is
P5o
M
i 5 1
pi5 S a˜ 2 b˜
S
W
 
; ð22Þ
which is maximized at S=W 5 a˜= 2b˜
 
, the value in (18) and (21). At that
value, P5 S a˜=2ð Þ, equivalent to an expected rate of return of a˜=2 on the
invested amount S. That expected rate of return, a˜=2, is earned as a˜ in
(17) by a single investor when facing competingmanagers. The same rate
of a˜=2 is also charged as the fee in (19) by a single manager facing com-
peting investors.WithN 51, profit ismaximized because the single inves-
tor fully internalizes the fact that his own investment determines S=W
and, thereby, expected profit. With M 51, the single manager acts as a
monopolist in setting the fee such that the resulting industry size pro-
duces fee revenue that captures the maximum expected profit.
Competitionmakes it easier to understand why the activemanagement
industry is large. When both managers and investors compete, the re-
sulting industry size of S=W 5 a˜=b˜ in (15) is twice as large as the profit-
maximizing size, asnotedearlier. This fully competitive industry size, which
is denoted by S=W in figure 1, produces zero expected profit in (22). De-
spite generatingnoprofits for investors ormanagers, the fully competitive
industry can nevertheless provide a positive externality to asset markets.
Suppose that the benchmark is “correct” in an asset-pricing context, in that
securities with nonzero alphas with respect to the benchmark are mis-
priced. Opportunities to outperform the benchmark then reflect mispric-
ing. If no money actively chased mispricing (S50), some mispricing
would likely exist. By moving prices toward fair values, the industry pro-
vides a positive externality to the (unmodeled) real side of the economy.
In themaximization in (12), we impose the lower bound of zero on the
elements of dj , but we have not imposed an upper bound. A reasonable
alternative is to impose the constraint
d′j iM ≤ 1; ð23Þ
which precludes shorting of the passive benchmark portfolio (cf. [10]).
When (23) binds, S=W in equation (15), (18), or (21) exceeds one, and
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the constrained equilibrium value of S=W instead equals one. Also, as
in the earlier unconstrained setting, f 50 with competition amongman-
agers, but then a˜ 5 a˜ 2 b˜, a positive value that does not depend on
whether investors compete. In essence, the constraint in (23) then pre-
vents investors from increasing the size of the industry to the point at
which all profit is eliminated. In contrast, when there is just a single
manager and (23) binds, the manager earns a fee greater than the value
in (19), while competition among investors still delivers a˜ 50. The
Appendix includes a treatment of the case in which (23) binds.
C. Equilibrium in the Mean-Variance Setting
Wenow turn to themean-variance setting inwhich investorsmaximize the
objective function in (9). Our primary focus is on the fully competitive
case (M → `, N → `). In Section IV, we also discuss results under the ad-
ditional scenarios discussed above, in which eitherM 51 orN 51. Those
results show that the equilibrium values of S=W closely follow the same
relative proportions across the alternative scenarios as in the risk-neutral
setting. That is, with either a single investor (N 51, M →`) or a single
manager (M 51,N → `), S=W is only about half as large as its fully com-
petitive value. Unlike the fully competitive case, where the equilibrium
can be computed analytically, the two additional cases require numerical
solutions. The solution procedures for those cases are explained in the
Appendix.
The explicit analytic solution for S=W in the fully competitive case—
the solution to a cubic equation—is fairly cumbersome.We instead simply
present that cubic equation in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In equilibriumwithperfect competition amongboth
managers and investors, if a˜ > 0, then S=W is given by the (unique) real
positive solution to the equation
05 a˜ 2
S
W
b˜ 1 g j2a 1 j
2
x
  
1
S
W
 2
2gjab2
S
W
 3
gj2b ð24Þ
when the constraint in (23) does not bind, where g5mP=j
2
P . If investors
also face the constraint in (23) and the solution to (24) exceeds one, then
S=W 51. If a˜ ≤ 0, then S=W 50.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the equilibrium value of S=W lies between zero and one, it can
be represented in mean-variance terms. To see this, let rA denote the
benchmark-adjusted return on the aggregate portfolio of all funds:
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rA5
1
M
i′MrF 2 rP
5
1
M
i′Ma 1 x 1
1
Mo
M
i 5 1
ei
5a2 b
S
W
1 x 1
1
Mo
M
i 5 1
ei ; ð25Þ
using equations (2), (3), (8), and the result that f 50 in equilibrium.
Thus, asM → `,
rA5 a2 b
S
W
1 x ð26Þ
since the variance of the last term in (25) goes to zero. It follows from (26)
that
E rAjDð Þ5 a˜ 2 b˜ SW ð27Þ
and
Var rAjDð Þ5 j2a 1 j2x22
S
W
 
jab 1
S
W
 2
j2b : ð28Þ
Equation (24) can then be rewritten as
S
W
5
a˜ 2 b˜ S=Wð Þ
g j2a 1 j
2
x22 S=Wð Þjab 1 S=Wð Þ2j2b
  ð29Þ
5
E rAjDð Þ
gVar rAjDð Þ; ð30Þ
where the resulting mean-variance expression in (30) relies on (27) and
(28).
We can also write equation (26) as rA5a 1 x, with a5 a2 b S=Wð Þ, so
that Var rAjDð Þ5j2x1 j2a, where j2a5Var ajDð Þ. Equation (30) can then be
rewritten as
S
W
5
a˜
g j2x 1 j
2
a
 5 a˜ 2 b˜ S=Wð Þ
g j2x 1 j
2
a
  ; ð31Þ
which gives
S
W
5
a˜
b˜ 1 g j2x 1 j2a
 : ð32Þ
754 journal of political economy
Note that j2
a
depends on S=W , thus requiring the solution to the cubic
equation in (24). In the special case in which a and b are known, j2
a
50
and the right-hand side of (32) yields the solution directly, so solving the
cubic equation is then unnecessary. As before in the risk-neutral solution
(15), we see in (32) that greater profitability of the first dollar invested
(higher a˜)makes the equilibrium industry size larger whilemore strongly
decreasing returns to scale (higher b˜) makes the industry smaller.
The role of uncertainty about a and b in determining industry size can
be seen in (32). This uncertainty enters through uncertainty about a,
which enters the denominator in (32) via gj2
a
. Greater uncertainty about
a thusmakes the industry smaller.We specify g (5 mP=j
2
P) as 1.92, which is
based on estimates for the market portfolio and the same January 1962–
September 2006 period over which our fund data are available.8 With this
value of g, the product gj2
a
can exert a nontrivial effect on industry size
when there is substantial uncertainty about a and b, such as one might
possess before updating prior beliefs with data. After such updating,
however, the magnitude of gj2
a
is often small compared to b˜, which also
appears in the denominator in (32). Thus, posterior uncertainty about a
and b typically does not exert a large effect on the equilibrium S=W .
Uncertainty about the unexpected active return also affects industry
size, via gj2x in the denominator in (32). We specify the volatility of the ag-
gregate active benchmark-adjusted return as jx50:02, or 2 percent per
year, which is approximately equal to the annualized residual standardde-
viation from the regression of the value-weighted average return of all ac-
tive US equity mutual funds on the market benchmark in the Janu-
ary 1962–September 2006 period. With this value of jx , the value of gj2x is
often small compared to b˜ , as is the value of gj2
a
after prior beliefs are up-
dated with data. As a result, after updating with data, the equilibrium value
of S=W is generally well approximated by (15), which omits the term
g j2x1 j
2
a
 
that appears in (32).
The industry’s expected alpha, a˜ 5 E rAjDð Þ, can be obtained by com-
bining equations (27) and (32) to give
a˜5 a˜
g j2x 1 j
2
a
 
b˜ 1 g j2x 1 j2a
 
" #
: ð33Þ
We see from (33) that a˜ > 0. In order for a positive allocation to active
management to offer investors a higher Sharpe ratio than the passive
benchmark, investorsmust expect compensation for the nondiversifiable
risky component x as well as for uncertainty about alpha.
8 Our data are described in more detail in Sec. III.B.
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III. Prior and Posterior Beliefs
In this section, we discuss the prior and posterior beliefs about the key
parameters, a and b, as well as beliefs about the alpha implied by those
parameters. We also describe our data.
A. Prior Beliefs
A common assumption in the literature is that returns to scale in active
investing are constant (b50). While we consider such a dogmatic prior
belief as well, our focus is on prior beliefs in which returns are decreasing
in scale at anuncertain rate (i.e., b is anunknownpositive value).We show
in Section IV that investors who believe a priori that b > 0 make very dif-
ferent investment decisions than investors who believe that b50, even af-
ter observing exactly the same evidence.
To capture decreasing returns to scale, we specify a bivariate normal
joint prior distribution for a and b, truncated to require that b ≥ 0:
a
b

∼N E 0;V0ð ÞI b ≥ 0ð Þ;

ð34Þ
whereN E 0;V0ð Þdenotes a bivariate normal distributionwithmean E 0 and
covariance matrix V0, and I cð Þ is an indicator function that equals one if
condition c is true and zero otherwise. Denote
E05
Ea0
Eb0

; V05
V aa0 V
ab
0
V ab0 V
bb
0

:

ð35Þ
We specify Eb0 5V
ab
0 50 for simplicity. We consider a wide range of prior
means of b, denoted by b0. In this section, we focus on b050:1, a value of
particular interest in the subsequent analysis. Given the properties of the
truncated normal distribution, this prior mean implies V bb0 50:016 and a
prior standard deviation for b equal to j0b 50:076. Themarginal prior dis-
tribution for b is plotted in panel B of figure 2: it is the right half of a zero-
mean normal distribution truncated below at zero.
Panel A of figure 2 plots three different marginal prior distributions
for a. All three distributions are normal. Their means and standard de-
viations, a0 and j0a, are specified such that investors with those prior beliefs
would optimally choose a given fraction S=Wð Þ0 before observing the his-
torical data. We consider three values of S=Wð Þ0: 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0. For
a given value of S=Wð Þ0, there generally exist multiple pairs of a0; j0a
 
for
which S=Wð Þ0 is the optimal allocation. To pick a single pair, we impose
the additional constraint that the prior probability of a <0 is 1 per-
cent. This constraint ismotivated by the discussion presented earlier in Sec-
tion II. Recall that a represents the expected return on the initial frac-
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tion of wealth invested in active management. As we argued in Section II,
if no money were invested in active management, some opportunities to
outperform passive benchmarks would likely exist, so the initial active
investment would almost certainly have a positive expected benchmark-
adjusted return. We thus specify priors that admit only a small (1 percent)
probability of a <0, as shown in panel A. In the robustness analysis pre-
sented in Section IV.D, we also consider probabilities of 0.1 percent and
10 percent.
FIG. 2.—Prior and posterior distributions for a and b. The figure plots priors and poste-
riors for a and b in the function at 5a2 b S=Wð Þt 2 f , whereat is the expectedactive bench-
mark-adjusted return, S=Wð Þt is the aggregate allocation to active management, and f is
the fee (zero under competition). The prior for b shown in panel B has a mean of 0.1.
Three priors for a based on that value are shown in panel A. All three have the property
prob a < 0ð Þ5 :01 but differ with respect to the “prior S=W ”: the S=W under the fully com-
petitive equilibrium based only on prior beliefs. Panels C and D display the posteriors ob-
tained after updating with the mutual fund data, covering the 1962–2005 period.
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B. Data
Investors update their prior beliefs with the histories of active returns
{rA;t } and equilibrium active allocations f S=Wð Þtg. In theory, these quanti-
ties can apply to the active management industry in its largest sense, en-
compassing not only mutual funds but also other segments of the indus-
try, such as defined-benefit pension funds. If the data were available, our
empirical analysis could take that broadest perspective. In reality, how-
ever, the availability of long series of reliable historical data limits our anal-
ysis tomutual funds, amajor segment of the industry.We viewmutual fund
data as a reasonable representation of active management as a whole, in
terms of both its historical returns and its share relative to passive invest-
ing. It is difficult to observe evidence for or against such a view, but we sug-
gest that it seems reasonable. An alternative interpretation of our model,
narrower but also reasonable, is simply that it pertains to mutual funds.
For the series of both rA;t and S=Wð Þt , we use the data compiled by
Fama and French (2010).9 For each year t from1963 through 2006, we set
rA;t 2 1 equal to the return on the aggregate portfolio of actively managed
US equity mutual funds, net of the return attributable to the portfolio’s
estimated exposures to the Center for Research in Security Prices value-
weighted market portfolio. For the market portfolio to represent a fair
benchmark for active funds, we need to take into account the small but non-
trivial costofholding themarket.Wedo soby subtracting15basispoints from
each annual market return.10 For each year t, we also construct S=Wð Þt as
the ratio of total assets undermanagement for nonindex funds to total as-
sets under management for all funds, both measured at the beginning of
year t. As shown in table 1, S=Wð Þt equals 1.00 from 1962 through 1976,
and then it graduallydeclines to 0.87 at the endof 2005.The timing is such
that rA;t is the return following investors’ equilibrium allocation S=Wð Þt .
C. Posterior Beliefs
To update their beliefs about a and b, investors conduct inference
about the coefficients in a time-series regression of returns on the equi-
librium allocations. At the end of the sample ofT years, the available data
9 Weare grateful toKenFrench for providing thedata, whichend in September 2006.The
classification of funds as active vs. passive is performed by Fama and French.
10 This amount is slightly smaller than the expense ratios of Vanguard’s 500 Index Fund
and Total Stock Market Index Fund (17 and 18 basis points, respectively, as of 2011), which
are among the largest and cheapest index funds available to retail investors. Expense ratios
of index funds used to be higher in the funds’ early years. Our assumption of the same low
expense ratio throughout the sample is conservative in that using a higher index fund ex-
pense ratio would make it easier to rationalize a high allocation to active management.
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in D consist of yT 5 rA;1 : : : rA;T½ ′ and z T 5 S=Wð Þ1 : : : S=Wð ÞT
 ′. In a re-
gression of yT on 2 zT and a constant, the intercept is a and the slope is
b (see eq. [26]). Recall that investors’ prior beliefs for a and b are given by
the bivariate truncated normal distribution in equation (34), whose non-
truncated moments are E0 and V0. Those moments are updated by using
standard Bayesian results for the multiple regression model
V 5 V 2 10 1
1
j2x
Z ′TZT
  2 1
; ð36Þ
E 5V V 2 10 E0 1
1
j2x
Z ′T yT
 
; ð37Þ
where ZT 5 iT2zT½ . The posterior distribution of a and b is bivariate
truncated normal as in equation (34), except that E 0 and V0 are replaced
TABLE 1
Returns and Relative Size of Actively Managed Funds
Year S=W Return
Adjusted
Return Year S=W Return
Adjusted
Return
1962 1.0000 216.84 24.09 1984 .9962 211.63 25.03
1963 1.0000 16.05 2.97 1985 .9951 20.43 22.32
1964 1.0000 11.01 21.19 1986 .9946 9.60 .66
1965 1.0000 14.68 4.71 1987 .9920 23.19 .47
1966 1.0000 29.89 3.24 1988 .9910 9.30 21.37
1967 1.0000 23.65 .26 1989 .9865 17.64 21.60
1968 1.0000 5.60 22.90 1990 .9809 213.91 2.32
1969 1.0000 218.99 22.03 1991 .9769 28.65 1.71
1970 1.0000 212.56 26.20 1992 .9718 4.53 2.70
1971 1.0000 13.71 2.44 1993 .9615 11.29 3.04
1972 1.0000 11.08 21.81 1994 .9579 25.23 2.58
1973 1.0000 227.49 22.54 1995 .9535 26.82 22.08
1974 1.0000 234.12 .76 1996 .9391 12.68 22.60
1975 1.0000 26.89 23.46 1997 .9251 19.58 24.51
1976 1.0000 17.51 23.29 1998 .9073 14.05 22.64
1977 .9996 28.13 2.16 1999 .8939 20.83 1.09
1978 .9993 2.94 1.78 2000 .8945 213.80 2.74
1979 .9978 15.88 2.46 2001 .8883 218.39 23.63
1980 .9977 22.03 .94 2002 .8822 224.09 22.23
1981 .9976 218.26 2.04 2003 .8791 29.97 2.92
1982 .9977 13.64 4.23 2004 .8720 10.92 2.36
1983 .9969 11.96 21.28 2005 .8686 4.72 .68
Note.—The table reports the fractionof totalUSmutual fund assets that are activelyman-
aged (S=W ), the percentage return on that aggregate active portfolio, and the portfolio’s
market-adjusted return. The adjusted return is equal to the intercept plus the residual in
a regression of the active portfolio’s return on the market return. The value of S=W is for
the end of the year during which the corresponding return occurs.
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by E and V from equations (36) and (37).11 Having the updated mo-
ments E and V of the nontruncated bivariate normal distribution, we apply
the relations inMuthen (1990) to obtain the updatedmoments of the trun-
cated bivariate normal distribution, defined in equations (5) and (6).12
Panels C and D of figure 2 show the posterior distributions for a and b,
respectively. Compared to the priors, the posteriors are shifted to the left,
indicating a downward revision in beliefs about a and b. For example, for
themiddle prior (solid line), the posterior mean for a is 0.06, which is be-
low the priormean of 0.09, and the posteriormean for b is 0.07, below the
prior mean of 0.1. Interestingly, while the posteriors are naturally tighter
than the priors, they remain quite disperse. For example, for the middle
prior, the values of zero and 0.15 are both well within the support of the
posterior distributions of both a and b. Investors clearly remain substan-
tially uncertain about a and b even after observing 44 years of data.
To understandwhy the posterior uncertainty about a and b is so large, it
helps to examine figure 3. The figure plots the observed active fund re-
turns rA;t against the observed active allocations S=Wð Þt for the full 44-year
sample. The sample estimates of a and b can be obtained by fitting a line
through the scatter plot infigure 3 andmeasuring the line’s intercept (5 a)
and slope (5 2b). It is immediately clear from figure 3 that these esti-
mates are very imprecise because more than half the observations are
bunched on top of each other at the right-hand-side edge of the plot; spe-
cifically, the first 27 observations in our 44-year sample have S=Wð Þt > 0:99.
Indeed, the confidence intervals for the ordinary least squares sample
estimates of a and b are very wide (the standard errors of both estimates
exceed 0.09, whereas the estimates themselves are both within 0.03 of
zero). Since the sample does not contain much information about a
and b, the posterior distributions in figure 2 are only modestly tighter
than the priors.
The investor’s beliefs about a and b, which are the key parameters in
our model, translate into beliefs about a, a more familiar quantity. Re-
call that a5 a2 b S=Wð Þ in the fully competitive setting. Figure 4 plots
the prior and posterior distributions for the equilibrium a, which is
a evaluated at the equilibrium value of S=W . The priors for a, shown
in panel A, are computed from the priors of a and b and the same prior
equilibrium values of S=Wð Þ0 as in figure 2: 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0. The poste-
11 In deriving the posterior of a and b from the regression of yT on 2zT , it is useful to
note that S=Wð ÞT is a deterministic function of its initial value and returns prior to time T,
so there is no randomness in S=W beyond what is in past returns. The likelihood function
is obtained simply by transforming the density of xs ; s51; : : : ; Tf g to the density of
rA;s ; s51; : : : ; Tf g, where the Jacobian of that transformation equals one. As a result, the
likelihood function is identical to what would arise if the observations of S=W were treated
as nonstochastic.
12 Earlier results for such moments appear in Rosenbaum (1961), but the published arti-
cle contains some errors in signs that we verified through simulation.
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riors for a, shown in panel B, are computed from the posteriors of a
and b and the values of S=W that obtain in equilibrium on the basis of
those posterior beliefs.
Figure 4 shows that all three priors are rather noninformative about a,
in thatmost of the probability mass is on values between roughly220 per-
cent and 20 percent per year. The prior standard deviations range from
5.3 percent to 9.1 percent per year across the three priors. In contrast, the
posteriors for a are much tighter: all three posterior standard deviations
are just below 0.5 percent per year. The large difference between panelsA
and B indicates that our 44-year sample contains a lot of information
about the equilibrium a. Another interesting comparison is that between
the tight posteriors of a in figure 4 and the relatively disperse posteriors
of a and b in figure 2. The large difference arises because a and b exhibit
a very high posterior correlation (about 99 percent). In other words, after
FIG. 3.—Active management’s relative size (S=W ) versus the benchmark-adjusted active
return. The figure plots the annual observations of the fraction of total US mutual fund as-
sets that are actively managed (horizontal axis) versus the market-adjusted percentage re-
turn on that aggregate active portfolio (vertical axis). The sample period is 1962–2005, and
eachS=W value is for the beginning of the year during which the corresponding return occurs.
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observing the full sample, investors remain quite uncertain about the
values of a and b, but they are quite certain that if a is high then b is high
as well. They are also quite certain that the equilibrium a is close to zero.
The posterior means of the equilibrium a are only about 7 basis points
per year for all three priors, indicating that investors do not requiremuch
compensation for bearing the risk associated with active investing (see
eq. [33]).
As a point of comparison, we also consider a dogmatic prior belief that
returns to scale are constant (b50). Under that prior, only the beliefs
about a are updated, following the standard result for updating themean
FIG. 4.—Prior and posterior distributions for alpha. The figure displays priors (panel A)
and posteriors (panelB) of alpha in the fully competitive setting, whereat 5a 2 b S=Wð Þt , and
S=Wð Þt is the aggregate allocation to active management. The priors and posteriors of
a displayed here are implied by the priors and posteriors of a and b displayed in figure 2.
The prior for b has a mean of 0.1; the three priors for a, based on that value, all have the
property prob a < 0ð Þ5 :01 but differ with respect to the “prior S=W ”: the S=W under the
fully competitive equilibriumbased only on prior beliefs. The posteriors are obtained by up-
dating the priors with the mutual fund data covering the 1962–2005 period.
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of a normal distribution. Given the history of returns, yT 5 rA;1 : : : rA;T½ ′
with sample average r¯ A;T , the posterior moments of a (and a) are given by
a˜ 5 a˜ 5
1
V aa0
1
T
j2x
 2 1 Ea0
V aa0
1
T r¯A;T
j2x
 
; ð38Þ
j2
a
5 j2a5
1
V aa0
1
T
j2x
 2 1
: ð39Þ
IV. Is the Industry’s Size Puzzling Given Its Track Record?
In this section, we use our model to ask whether it is puzzling that the ac-
tive management industry remains large, given its unflattering historical
performance. Specifically, we explore properties of prior beliefs that
would lead the rational investors in ourmodel to choose a large allocation
to active management, once they update their beliefs with the historical
data. As discussed earlier, our model is not limited to mutual funds, but
our empirical analysis treats that segment as representative of activeman-
agement’s relative size and track record, given the availability of mutual
fund data.We thus take themost recent value of the S=W series described
earlier, 0.87, as the empirical benchmark against which to compare equi-
librium values of S=W implied by the model.
A. Importance of Decreasing Returns to Scale
Key to our analysis is the prior belief about b, the degree of decreasing re-
turns to scale. The prior for b is fully determined by the prior mean b0, as
explained in Section III. Figure 5 plots the equilibrium allocation S=W
for a wide range of values of b0. For each value of b0, the prior for the other
unknown parameter, a, is specified such that prob a <0ð Þ5 :01 and the
equilibrium S=W based on just the prior beliefs about a and b is equal to
0.8 in the fully competitive setting (M →`, N → `).13 The values of S=W
plotted in the figure are computed after updating beliefs about a and b
with the histories of rA;t and S=Wð Þt used in the previous section.
Our main result appears as the solid line in figure 5, which plots the
equilibrium S=W in the fully competitive setting. We see that the current
size of the active management industry is consistent with beliefs that the
industry faces decreasing returns to scale. For b0 ≥ 0:1 or so, the equilib-
rium S=W essentially matches the empirical benchmark value of 0.87. In-
13 Our results are robust to alternative prior specifications, as discussed later in Sec. IV.D.
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vestors are willing to invest that much despite poor past performance be-
cause past underperformance does not imply future underperformance.
Under decreasing returns to scale, the expected return in any given pe-
riod is conditional on the investment level S=W in that period. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, historical returns were earned at various
levels of S=W all higher than 0.87, allowing investors to believe that per-
formance going forward will be positive at S=W 50:87.
With decreasing returns, investors’ allocation to activemanagement af-
ter observing poor performance can actually be higher than what they
would allocate without seeing that performance. For b0 ≥ 0:05or so, inves-
tors who allocate 80 percent to activemanagement before seeing the data
FIG. 5.—Equilibrium active allocation: effects of competition. For different numbers of
funds (M) and investors (N), the figure plots the equilibrium aggregate allocation to active
management (S=W ) based on updated beliefs that incorporate mutual fund data for the
1962–2005 period. For each value of thepriormeanof b, the prior for a is specified such that
prob a < 0ð Þ5 :01 and the equilibrium S=W equals 0.8 in the perfectly competitive case
(M → `,N → `) when basedonly on the prior distribution for a and b. The “Data” line rep-
resents S=W 50:87, the value at the end of 2005 for the mutual fund industry.
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allocate a higher fraction after seeing the data, even though the data in-
clude a negative return history. One reason is resolution of uncertainty
about alpha. Recall that the posterior uncertainty about the equilibrium
alpha is substantially lower than the prior uncertainty (fig. 4) and that this
uncertainty (j2
a
) appears in thedenominator of S=W in (32). Another rea-
son is that investors update their beliefs using not only the return history
but also thehistory of S=Wð Þt . A valueof b05 0:1means that, before seeing
the data, investors expect that reducing S=W by 0.1 would raise alpha by
1 percent. Recall fromfigure 2 that investors’ posterior beliefs about b are
shifted to the left relative to the prior. Although the posterior of a also
shifts closer to zero, that shift is more than offset by the reductions in
j2
a
and the mean of b, producing a higher ratio in (32).
The story is very different if investors believe that b50, that is, that re-
turns to scale are constant. For example, if such investors have the same
prior for a as in the case in which b050:1, they invest nothing in active
management after updating with the same historical data.14 We also see
that S=W in figure 5 takes substantially lower values as the prior mean of
b moves closer to zero.
B. Decreasing Returns versus Optimism
The b50 setting also underscores the point that our story hinges on de-
creasing returns to scale (b > 0) as opposed to investor optimism about
active management. Panel A of figure 6 displays percentiles of the prior
for a in the b50 specification described above. This prior is the same as
thedistribution for adisplayed as the solid line in panelAof figure 2.With
b50, this is the prior for a at all levels of S=W . The corresponding prior
for a in the b > 0 setting, with b050:1, is displayed in panel B of figure 6.
In the latter setting, the prior for a depends on S=W . For S=W 50, the
prior fora is the same as in the b50 case in panelA, but as S=W increases,
all of the percentiles decline. In other words, at all positive levels of S=W ,
the prior fora ismore optimistic when b50 than when b > 0. Despite the
higher prior optimism about a, the equilibrium value of S=W equals zero
after the b50 prior is updated with the data. In contrast, when the same
data are used to update the less optimistic b > 0 prior, the resulting equi-
librium S=W matches the empirical benchmark of 0.87. This striking dif-
ference arises because the b50 and b > 0 priors are updated very differ-
ently, as explained earlier in Section III.
14 When b50, the cubic equation in (24) simplifies to a linear equation. In this case, j2
a
does not depend on S=W , so the equilibrium S=W is given directly by the first equality in
(31). The active-management allocation problem is then essentially equivalent to the setting
in Treynor and Black (1973) but with the addition of parameter uncertainty.
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C. Importance of Competition
Competition plays an important role in determining the industry’s size.
Figure 5 also displays the equilibrium S=W when there is no competition
among investors or no competition among managers. In analyzing these
additional cases, we assume that investors have the same priors about a
and b as in the fully competitive case, and they update with the same data.
We see from the dashed line that solving the active-management alloca-
tion problem from the perspective of a single representative investor un-
derstates industry size by about half, even thoughmanagers compete with
each other (M → `,N 51). The dotted line shows that the industry’s size
is similarly understated by half if competitive investors allocate to an in-
dustry that acts as a monopolist (M 51,N →`). Thus, we see that the ef-
fects of competition, obtained numerically in this mean-variance setting,
follow closely the closed-form results obtained in the risk-neutral setting.
D. Robustness
Our results are quite robust to alternative specifications. Recall that
for a given prior distribution of b, the prior for a is specified such that
prob a <0ð Þ5 :01 and S=W equals 0.8 on the basis of the prior for a
and b. We now consider alternative values for these prior criteria. Spe-
cifically, we allow the prior value of S=W to be 1.0 or 0.6, and we allow
prob a <0ð Þ to be .1 or .001. Figure 7 displays the equilibrium S=W in the
FIG. 6.—Priors for alpha: constant versus decreasing returns to scale. For each value of
the aggregate allocation to active management (S=W ), thefigure displays percentiles of the
prior distribution for alpha under constant returns to scale (panel A) and decreasing re-
turns to scale (panel B), where at 5a2 b S=Wð Þt . Theprior for a is displayed as the solid line
in panel A of figure 2. Under constant returns to scale, the prior for b is dogmatic at b50.
Under decreasing returns to scale, the prior for b has amean of 0.1 and is displayed in panel
B of figure 2. The ordering of the five lines in the plots is the same as in the legend box.
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fully competitive setting after updating these alternative priors with
the historical data. Each panel reports results under all three prior values
of S=W . Panel Bmaintains the original specification of prob a <0ð Þ5 :01;
in panel A that probability is 10 times smaller, while in panel C it is
10 times larger.
While there are some differences across panels A–C of figure 7, all the
results paint the samebasic picture as theoriginal result (solid line infig. 5).
That is, as b0 increases, the equilibrium level of S=W rises sharply to a level
approximately equal to the empirical benchmark. It does not rise quite
FIG. 7.—Equilibrium active allocation: robustness to priors. For alternative specifications
of priors, the figure plots the fully competitive equilibrium aggregate allocation to active
management (S=W ), which appears as the solid curve in figure 5 under the original prior
specification. Panel B maintains the original specification prob a < 0ð Þ5 :01 and considers
three values—0.6, 0.8, and 1.0—for the “prior S=W ,” which is the equilibrium allocation
based only on prior beliefs. The same three prior S=W values are then used with each of
two alternative values of prob a < 0ð Þ: panel A uses prob a < 0ð Þ5 :001, and panel C uses
prob a < 0ð Þ5 :1. Panel D treats the case in which b is known with certainty to equal the value
on the horizontal axis; this case specifies prob a < 0ð Þ5 :01 and considers the same three
prior S=W values.
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that high in panel C, which assigns a nontrivial 10 percent probability to
even the first dollar of active management being unprofitable, but in gen-
eral the results are robust to the various alternative specifications of the
prior for a.
PanelD of figure 7displays results in thehypothetical scenario inwhich
the value of b is known a priori. The prior for a is specified using the same
criteria as in the baseline case inpanelB. PanelD shows that the empirical
benchmark level of S=W is reached when b is known to be about 0.07,
whereas reaching the same benchmark with unknown b requires a prior
mean for b of about 0.1 (fig. 5). Removing uncertainty about b thus
makes it easier to explain the empirical value of S=W with our decreasing-
returns story, in that a known degree of decreasing returns can be weaker
than what must be expected a priori when b is unknown.
Another result of knowing b is that the prior for a becomes less impor-
tant. This result is demonstrated by the similarity of the three lines repre-
senting different prior S=W values in panel D. It also follows from the
plots (not shown) based on the other two values of prob a <0ð Þ, which are
virtually indistinguishable from panel D. The reason behind this result is
that when b is known, the historical data becomemore informative about
the single remaining unknown parameter, a.
V. Future Size of the Active Management Industry
While the previous section focuses on the present size of the activemanage-
ment industry, this section looks into the future. In Section V.A, we conduct
simulations to calculate the expected future industry size after observing
various potential track records. In Section V.B, we use the same simulations
to investigate the speed of learning about returns to scale. To preview our
results, we find that the industry is likely to remain large even if it continues
to underperform. We also find that learning about a and b is slow, high-
lighting the rationale for treating these quantities as uncertain.
A. Expected Future Industry Size
In this subsection, we assess the expected future size of the activemanage-
ment industry conditional on a summarymeasure of the industry’s future
track record. We assume that investors enter the future with beliefs about
a and b consistent with the industry’s current size. We then compute the
expected future values of the equilibrium S=W for different values of the
t-statistic of the industry’s future estimated alpha.Wefind that S=W is likely
to remain large for a long period of time, even if the industry’s future
alpha turns out to be significantly negative as measured by the t-statistic.
We simulate 300,000 samples of future returns on active funds. To
simulate a given sample, we first draw a and b randomly from their joint
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posterior distribution at the end of our 44-year sample. We pick the base-
line posterior distribution whose marginals are plotted by the solid lines
in panels C and D of figure 2. Recall that this posterior is obtained from
the prior for which b050:1, the prior probability of a <0 is 1 percent, and
theprior equilibrium S=W is 0.8; the correspondingposterior equilibrium
S=W of 0.867 approximately matches the observed value (see fig. 5). In
the second step, we draw the random values of xt ∼N 0; j2x
 
for t
51; : : : ; 20 years. We construct the first future benchmark-adjusted ac-
tive return as rA;15 a2 b 0:867ð Þ1 x1, following equation (26). On the ba-
sis of this return, we update the beliefs about a and b, following equations
(36) and (37). We then solve for the new equilibrium allocation S=Wð Þ2
on the basis of those updated beliefs using proposition 2. Next, we con-
struct rA;25 a2 b S=Wð Þ21 x2 and repeat the above procedure, building
up the time series of rA;t and S=Wð Þt for t5 1; : : : ; 20. Note that S=Wð Þt
affects rA;t , which in turn affects S=Wð Þt1 1, and so on. For every t, we com-
pute an estimate of the industry’s alpha, or aˆ , as the sample average of
rA;1; : : : ; rA;tf g, andwe calculate the t-statistic aˆ
ﬃﬃ
t
p
=jx . Finally, we compute
the expected S=Wð Þt conditional on a given value t0 of the t-statistic as the
average value of S=Wð Þt across all simulated samples producing t-statistics
within a small neighborhood of t 0. The results are plotted in panel A of
figure 8.
Panel A of figure 8 plots the expected future values of S=Wð Þt , or
E S=Wð Þ, conditional on the future t-statistics of22, 0, and 2. Conditional
on the t-statistic of 0, E S=Wð Þ is roughly constant, declining from the cur-
rent value of 86.7 percent to 86.2 percent after 20 years. The slight decline
reflects themild disappointment of investors who expect to earn a slightly
positive aˆ (of about 7 basis points per year, as noted in the description
of fig. 4) but end up earning aˆ50. Conditional on the t-statistic of22,
E S=Wð Þ declines over time. Not surprisingly, if the industry’s perfor-
mance turns out to be worse than expected, the industry is expected to
shrink to the benefit of passive investments. More interesting, E S=Wð Þ
remains substantial for long periods of time: it declines from86.7 percent
to 72.5percent after 10 years and to 63.4 percent after 20 years. That is, the
industry is expected to remain large even if it continues to significantly
underperform its benchmark. This striking result is due to decreasing re-
turns to scale. Investors observing underperformance reduce their active
allocation, but not as much as they would under constant returns to scale
because they understand that when they allocate less to active manage-
ment, their future active returns will be higher. (Specifically, investors re-
duce S=W until a reaches its positive equilibrium level in eq. [33].)
Panel A also shows that conditional on the t-statistic of 2, E S=Wð Þ rises
to 92.2 percent after 20 years. If the industry performs better than ex-
pected, it grows at the expense of passive investments, but its growth is re-
strained by decreasing returns to scale: investors know that when they al-
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locate more to active management, their future returns will be lower. Be-
cause of this key mechanism, S=W is expected to vary slowly over time re-
gardless of performance.Overall, panelA of figure 8 shows that the active
management industry is likely to remain large for many years.
A very different picture emerges if investors believe a priori that returns
to scale are constant (b50). In that case, there is no need to simulate be-
cause the t-statistic of aˆ is a sufficient statistic for S=W : a given future t-
statistic implies a unique future value of S=W . To produce a fair compar-
FIG. 8.—Expected future industry size conditional on given future performance. This fig-
ure plots the expected values of S=W , the fully competitive equilibriumaggregate allocation
to active management, over 20 future years for different t-statistics of the future sample es-
timate of the active industry’s alpha. Panel A plots the expected values of S=W conditional
on future t-statistics of 22, 0, and 2 under decreasing returns to scale. In this case, future
active returns are simulated on the basis of the posteriors of a and b represented by the
solid lines in figure 2. Panel B plots the future values of S=W implied by three sets of future
t-statistics, t > 0:15, t 50, and t <20:74, under constant returns to scale. In this case, b50
and the distribution of a is normal with the same mean and variance as the posterior distri-
bution of a in figure 4.
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ison with the b > 0 case discussed above, we choose the distribution of a
such that investors with the b50 prior perceive the same mean and
variance of a as in the b > 0 case. Specifically, since b50 implies a5a,
we assume that the distribution of a is normal with the same mean and
variance as the posterior distribution of a obtained under the b > 0 prior
(see panel B of fig. 4). As a result, investors initially choose the same
S=W (of 86.7 percent) in both cases (see eq. [31]). The resulting future
values of S=W are plotted in panel B of figure 8.
PanelBoffigure 8 shows that under constant returns to scale, the indus-
try’s size is much more sensitive to performance. Conditional on the t-
statistic of 0, S=W drops from 86.7 percent to 45.6 percent after 20 years.
The reason behind the drop is the same as in the b > 0 case, but the mag-
nitude ismuch larger.When b50, the response of S=W to performance is
no longer cushioned by decreasing returns to scale in that a reduction in
S=W no longer implies a higher expected future return. The results are
even more dramatic when we condition on nonzero t-statistics. For any
t-statistic greater than 0.15, S=W jumps to one after the very first year. For
any t-statistic below20.74, we obtain the other corner solution, S=W 50,
after just 1 year of underperformance. These implications appear less
plausible than those obtained under decreasing returns to scale.
In simulating the future, we apply our model’s equilibrium inmultiple
successive years. As explained earlier, the active return rA in each year de-
pends on the equilibrium active allocation S=W chosen in the previous
year. In that sense, ourmodel delivers a year-by-year dependence between
rA and S=W , generally implying that an unexpectedly high rA in a given
year causes a higher S=W going into the next year. In principle, one could
also look for this dependence in the year-by-year historical data in table 1,
but we do not believe that such an exercise would be very informative.
Indexing was novel when it emerged on the investment landscape dur-
ing the 1970s. Understanding subsequent year-by-year fluctuations in its
share relative to activemanagementmust surely havemuch to dowith the
dissemination and adoption of financial innovation, which we cannot
hope to capture in our simple model. The strength and duration of the
innovation-related effects in the historical year-by-year variation of S=W
are difficult to assess, and we think that a conservative approach here is
best. That is, we simply assume that indexing, by now, has evolved to a fairly
mature and familiar alternative, enough so that it is reasonable to entertain
current and future active versus passive decisions as being dependent on
track records.
B. Learning about Returns to Scale
The values of a and b are unknown to investors. How fast can investors
learn about a and b by observing realized returns and active allocations?
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To answer this question, we rely on the 300,000 simulated samples de-
scribed in the previous subsection.
As investors learn, their posterior standard deviations of a and b de-
cline over time. The rate of decline in these standard deviations depends
on the true values of a and b. We draw these values from their joint poste-
rior distribution, as described earlier. The probability distribution of a
and b thus gives rise to distributions of the posterior standard deviations
of a and b. Panels A and B of figure 9 show the evolution of these distribu-
tions over time. Both panels plot selected percentiles of the distribu-
FIG. 9.—Speed of learning about a and b. Panels A and B plot the evolution of selected
percentiles of the distributions of the posterior standard deviations of a and b, respectively,
over 20 future years under decreasing returns to scale. In this case, future active returns are
simulated on the basis of the posteriors of a and b represented by the solid lines in figure 2.
Panel C plots the evolution of the posterior standard deviation of a over 20 future years
under constant returns to scale. In this case, b50 and the distribution of a is normal with
the same mean and variance as the posterior distribution of a in figure 4. Panel D simply
indicates that the posterior standard deviation of b under constant returns to scale is zero.
The ordering of the five lines in panels A and B is the same as in the legend box.
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tion of the respective standard deviation across the 300,000 simulated
samples.
Panels A and B of figure 9 show that learning about a and b is typically
slow. For the median sample, the posterior standard deviations decline
onlymodestly over the 20-year period: from 0.030 to 0.026 for a and from
0.031 to 0.028 for b. Investors thus typically remainhighly uncertain about
a and b even after 20 additional years of learning (on top of the 44 years in
our sample). This result underscores the importance of incorporating
uncertainty about a and b in assessing the size of the active management
industry.
Why is learning about a and b slow? The reason is the endogeneity in
the way investors learn: what they learn affects howmuch they invest, and
howmuch they invest affects what they learn. As explained in Section V.A,
fluctuations in S=W are muted by decreasing returns to scale. The result-
ing stability of S=W hampers learning about a and b. To see why, recall
that a and b represent the intercept and slope from the regression of rA;t
on 2 S=Wð Þt . If the right-hand-side variable in the regression does not
fluctuate much, learning about the intercept and slope is slow. At the
extreme, if S=W stops fluctuating, learning about a and b stops as well.
In that case, investors would eventually learn the true value ofa at the pre-
vailing level of S=W , but they would never learn a and b, so they would
forever remain uncertain about a at any other level of S=W .
The extreme case in which S=W stops fluctuating also helps illustrate
the link between slow learning and competition among investors. The ag-
gregate active allocation S=W is determined in equilibriumby competing
investors who cannot coordinate their investment decisions. If investors
could instead coordinate, they might well find it useful to continue vary-
ing S=W so as to continue learning about a and b. In a multiperiod set-
ting, such investors would trade off near-term optimality of their current
allocation against the potential future value of additional learning by ex-
perimenting with different allocations. The additional learning could be
valuable, for example, if investors could experience a future preference
shock that would make their previous allocation suboptimal. With learn-
ing about a and b shut down, investors are uncertain about a at any allo-
cation other than the current one. The prospect of wanting to change
their allocation in the future creates an incentive for additional learning
about a and b.
The speed of learning about a and b can be faster or slower than in the
median case discussed above, depending on the path of S=W . For exam-
ple, the 95th percentile of the posterior standard deviation of a after
20 years is 0.029, which is only slightly smaller than the initial value of
0.030. For these simulated samples, in which S=W fluctuates the least,
hardly any learning takes place. In contrast, the 5th percentile of the same
distribution is only 0.018, indicating much faster learning for samples in
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which S=W fluctuates more. This interesting path dependence of the
speed of learning is a direct consequence of decreasing returns to scale.15
In contrast to the fascinating learning process under decreasing re-
turns to scale, learning under constant returns to scale is straightforward
(see eqq. [38] and [39]). With b50, the value of a (5 a) is simply the un-
conditional mean return. The posterior standard deviation of a, plotted
in panel C of figure 9, declines at the usual
ﬃﬃ
t
p
rate, regardless of the par-
ticular sample realization. Investors learndifferently under decreasing re-
turns to scale because the level and variation in S=Wð Þt affect learning
when b > 0 but not when b50. To summarize, learning about decreasing
returns to scale is path dependent and generally slow, leaving investors
highly uncertain about a and b even after observing long histories of re-
turns and active allocations.
VI. Relation to Berk and Green (2004)
A central feature of our model is that active managers face decreasing re-
turns to scale in their abilities to generate alpha. In this respect our ap-
proach follows the seminal work of Berk and Green (2004), but there are
important differences. First, Berk and Green assume that decreasing re-
turns apply at the level of individual funds, whereas we assume that they
apply to the active management industry as a whole. That is, we assume
that an individual fund’s alpha is decreasing in the total amount invested
by all active funds.16 It seems reasonable that even a small fund finds it
more difficult to identify profitable investment opportunities as the over-
all amount of actively invested capital grows and thereby moves prices to
eliminate such opportunities.17 Assuming decreasing returns at the indi-
vidual fund level seems plausible as well, though it encounters the ques-
tion of what happens if multiple funds merge or additional managers are
hired. Presumably, in the absence of aggregate effects, such mergers or
15 As an aside, panels A and B show that for a small subset of simulated samples, the pos-
terior standard deviations exceed the prior ones in the first few years. This result is due to
truncation in theprior for b (b ≥ 0). The standarddeviationof any left-truncatednormal dis-
tribution is increasing in themeanof the samedistribution. Therefore, sampleevidence that
raises the posteriormean also pushes up the posterior standard deviation. This forcemay be
stronger or weaker than the offsetting effect of learning, which always pulls the posterior
standard deviation down.
16 It is easy to show that our assumptionofdecreasing returns to scale at the aggregate level
also implies decreasing returns to scale at the individual fund level. However, this implica-
tion weakens as the number of funds grows larger. Empirical evidence on returns to scale at
the fund level for mutual funds is provided by Chen et al. (2004), Pollet andWilson (2008),
and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2011). Related evidence for hedge funds, at the fund level as well
as aggregate level, is provided by Fung et al. (2008).
17 A similar perspective is adopted by Glode and Green (2011), who argue that fund re-
turns can be decreasing in the size of a sector or trading strategy, as well as in the size of the
fund itself. Glode and Green develop a model of information spillovers that can rationalize
performance persistence in hedge funds.
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hires would simply keep increasing the fund size at which decreasing re-
turns take their bite.
A second difference in our treatment of decreasing returns to scale is
that we do not assume that investors know the degree to which alpha
drops as the amount of active management increases. In our parameter-
ization of decreasing returns in (4), the values of both a and b are un-
known. In contrast, the model in Berk and Green (2004) corresponds
to a setting in which a is unknown but b is known.18 As discussed earlier,
when both a and b in (4) are unknown, investors face an interesting learn-
ing problem in which learning about those parameters is generally slow.
Another difference from Berk and Green (2004) is that their investors
face a˜ 5 0, whereas ours perceive a˜ > 0. Our investors maximize (9).
Berk and Green do not solve the investors’ optimization problem explic-
itly; instead, they fix a˜ 5 0 by invoking the assumption that nonbench-
mark risk can be completely diversified away across many funds. Berk and
Green argue that if a large number of funds were to have positive alphas,
one could combine them in aportfolio with apositive alpha and zeronon-
benchmark risk; a˜ 5 0 is thus a necessary condition for equilibrium. Re-
call from proposition 1 that our model also implies a˜ 5 0 in the special
case of perfect competitionwith risk-neutral investors. If investors are risk
averse, then a˜ > 0 because investors require compensation for both non-
diversifiable risk (jx) and uncertainty about a (ja), as shown in equation
(33). However, a˜ in the competitive setting is not necessarily large, espe-
cially if learning proceeds to the point at which ja is small. For example,
the posterior mean of a in our figure 4 is only 7 basis points per year, as
noted earlier. Thus, even though our modeling of the determinants of
equilibrium alpha is rather different from that of Berk and Green, their
zero-alpha condition is not at sharp odds with our model in practical
terms.19
VII. Conclusion
It seems puzzling that active management remains popular despite its
poor track record.We propose a potential resolution to this puzzle. Using
a model with competing investors and fund managers, we find that the
large observed size of the activemanagement industry can be rationalized
if investors believe that activemanagers face decreasing returns to scale. If
investors instead believed that returns to scale were constant, they would
18 Berk and Green denote the quantity corresponding to our b as a in their quadratic
parameterization, and they view this quantity as known. Their a corresponds to our a: they
use a to denote the expected return gross of fees and costs, whereas we use a to denote
the expected benchmark-adjusted return received by investors (see eq. [2]).
19 A closely related statement is that in our model, past performance predicts future per-
formance, but only slightly.
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allocate nothing to active management today, even if they were initially
more optimistic about active managers’ abilities.
Under decreasing returns to scale, investors adjust their allocation in
response to performance to achieve the desired expected return going
forward. After a period of underperformance, the proportional alloca-
tion to activemanagement should be smaller than it was at the beginning
of the period, but it should also remain substantial. Both predictions are
consistent with the empirical evidence for active mutual funds, which
have underperformed passive benchmarks over the past four decades:
passive investing has grown dramatically since its humble beginnings in
the 1970s, but active investing remains more popular to this day. We also
show that the active management industry is likely to remain large for
many more years, even if it continues to perform poorly.
Investors in ourmodel face endogeneity that limits their learning: what
they learn affects howmuch they allocate to activemanagement, andwhat
they allocate affects howmuch they learn. Owing to this endogeneity, the
equilibrium allocation tends to vary little over time, resulting in slow
learning about the degree of returns to scale in active management. Ini-
tial beliefs about returns to scale thus affect the investors’ active alloca-
tions for a long time.
Given the inherent difficulty in estimating returns to scale, further em-
pirical work seems warranted. Besides estimating returns to scale at the
aggregate level, one could also try to measure them for various segments
of the active management industry. Future research can also explore ad-
ditional aspects of learning about the parameters governing returns to
scale. Those parameters are held constant in ourmodel for simplicity, but
they could plausibly vary because of exogenous shocks, such as shocks to
market liquidity. In such a setting, parameter uncertainty would get re-
freshed periodically, further slowing the learning process. Continuing re-
search into decreasing returns to scale in active management is likely to
yield nondecreasing returns.
Appendix
This appendix provides details of the equilibria in the various settings considered.
After brief preliminaries, we first analyze the risk-neutral setting and then turn to
the mean-variance setting. In both settings we consider three cases: perfect com-
petition among managers and investors (M→ `, N→ `), perfectly competitive
managers facing a single investor (M→ `, N 51), and perfectly competitive in-
vestors facing a single manager (M 5 1, N→ `).
Combining equations (8) and (11) gives investor j ’s excess portfolio return as
rj 5 rP 1 d′j aiM 2 b
S
W
iM 2 f 1 u
 
; ðA1Þ
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where f is the M1 vector of fund fees. Denote qj 5 d′j iM . We then obtain
E rj jD
 
5mP1 a˜ 2 b˜
S
W
 
qj 2 d′j f ; ðA2Þ
Var rj jD
 
5j2P 1 j
2
a 1 j
2
x 1 j
2
b
S
W
 2
22jab
S
W
 
q2j 1 j
2
e
d′j dj
	 

: ðA3Þ
When a˜ ≤ 0, investors invest nothing in active management (recall that the
elements of dj must be nonnegative). In that case, a positive investment in active
managementwouldproduce a lower expected return andhigher variance than an
all-benchmark investment; therefore, S=W 50 in equilibrium. Since activeman-
agement does exist, we assume hereafter that a˜ > 0.
Whenmanagers are perfectly competitive (M → `), it is clear that f must be the
zero vector in equilibrium. Anymanager charging a positive fee would be offering
investors a lower expected return than any zero-fee competitors. In a risk-neutral
setting, it follows immediately that such a manager would receive no investment.
In a mean-variance setting, the presence of many competing managers allows in-
vestors to hold well-diversified portfolios, with the property that d′j dj → 0, so the
positive-fee manager offers no reduction in overall variance. Thus, compared to
his many zero-fee competitors, a positive-fee manager would simply be offering
a lower expected returnwith no reduction in variance, andhewould again receive
no investment.
A. Risk-Neutral Setting
M → ` and N → `: When investors are perfectly competitive (N→`), investor j
views the choice of qj as having no effect on S=W . Since f is zero with perfectly
competitivemanagers, it follows from (A2) that each risk-neutral investor chooses
qj to maximize the expected return
E rj jD
 
5mP1 a˜ 2 b˜
S
W
 
qj : ðA4Þ
If (23) does not bind, investor j ’s first-order condition in maximizing (A4) is
(15), which then delivers (14), using (8) and fi 50. If (23) binds, then every in-
vestor desires qj > 1 and S=W 51. In that case, a˜ 5 a˜ 2 b˜ is positive.
M → ` andN 51: WhenN 51, the single investor realizes thatqj 5 S=W and re-
places (A4) with
E rj jD
 
5mP1 a˜ 2 b˜
S
W
 
S
W
: ðA5Þ
If (23) does not bind, the equilibrium value of S=W that maximizes expected
return is given by (18). If (23) binds, then, as in the previous case, S=W 51 and
a˜ 5 a˜ 2 b˜.
M 51 and N → `: Here the monopolistic manager sets the rate f to maximize
fee revenue f S. For a given f, we see from (A2) that each investor j chooses qj to
maximize
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E rj jD
 
5mP1 a˜ 2 b˜
S
W
2 f
 
qj ; ðA6Þ
giving the first-order condition
S5W
a˜ 2 f
b˜
; ðA7Þ
and thus
f S5W
f a˜ 2 fð Þ
b˜
: ðA8Þ
Knowing (A8), the manager sets the maximizing value f 5 a˜=2, as given in (19).
Substituting that value into (A7) implies S=W 5 a˜= 2b˜
 
, as given in (21). Substi-
tuting those values for f and S=W into (8) gives (20). If a˜= 2b˜
 
> 1, then satisfying
(23) requires S=W 51 and, therefore, f 5 a˜2 b˜ .
B. Mean-Variance Setting
M → ` and N → `: Since in this setting we can set f and d′j dj to zero, as discussed
earlier, each investor solves
max
qj
E rj jD
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Var rj jD
 q
8><
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where E rj jD
 
is given by (A4) and Var rj jD
 
is given by
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When the constraint in (23) does not bind, the first-order condition for the max-
imization in (A9) is
05 a˜ 2 b˜
S
W
 
j2P 2qj j
2
a 1 j
2
x 1 j
2
b
S
W
 2
22jab
S
W
 
mP : ðA11Þ
Dividing throughbyj2P, recallingg5mP=j
2
P , and recognizing thatqj 5 S=W in equi-
librium gives the cubic equation in (24). It can be verified that this equation has
one positive real solution for S=W . If that solution exceeds one, the constraint in
(23) binds, and then S=W 51.
M → ` and N 51: As in the above case, we can set f and d′j dj to zero. As in the
earlier risk-neutral setting, a single investor solving (A9) realizes that qj 5 S=W .
The expected return is then given by (A5), and the variance is given by
Var rj jD
 
5 j2P 1
S
W
 2
j2a 1 j
2
x
 
1
S
W
 4
j2b 22
S
W
 3
jab : ðA12Þ
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Equilibrium is computed by using (A5) and (A12) to solve (A9) numerically, sub-
ject to the constraint S=W ≤ 1.
M 51 andN → `: As in the risk-neutral setting, the expected return is given by
(A6). In this single-manager case, we consider the aggregate portfolio of active
funds as if it weremanaged by amonopolist, so je50 for this diversified portfolio.
The investor’s return variance is then given by (A3). Substituting the equilibrium
condition qj 5 S=W into investor j’s first-order condition for the maximization in
(A9) leads to the cubic equation
05 a˜ 2 f 2
S
W
b˜ 1 g j2a 1 j
2
x
  
1
S
W
 2
2gjab2
S
W
 3
gj2b ; ðA13Þ
which is the same as (24) but with a˜ replaced by a˜ 2 f . Equilibrium is computed
numerically by finding the value of f thatmaximizes f times the solution to (A13)
given f.
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